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[S8.(I. No. 7611.

In Bank.

Sept. 6, 1966.]

Estate of PETER BAGLIONE, Deceased. MARIE BAGLI.
ONE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ALBERT L. WAGNER,
as Executor, etc., et at, Defendants and Respondents.
[Sac. No. 7646. In Bank.

Sept. 6, 1966.]

MARIE BAGLIONE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ALBERT
L. WAGNER, as Executor, etc., Defendant and Respondent; CARMELLO BAGLIONE et aI., Interveners
and Respondents.
(Two Cases.)
[1] Husband and Wif~Property-What Constitutes Community
and Separate Property.-A finding that real property held by
a husband and wife was community property, despite the fact
that they took title originally under a joint tenancy deed, was
supported by their pleadings in a subsequent divorce action in .
which each of them alleged that the property was community
property.
[2a,2b] Decedents' Estates-Appeal-Harmless Error.-A probate
court, having detennined that a widow was entitled to at least
her community share of estate real property in dispute, should
also have determined any other interests she had in the same
property under an alleged agreement that on the death of
either spouse all property accumulated during the marriage
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d. Community Property, § 75; Am.Jur.2d, Community Property, § 70.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Husband and Wife, § 34; [2] Decedents' Estates, § 1128; [3,4] Decedents' Estates, § 32; [5] Courts,
§ 160; Decedents' Estates, § 19; [6] Frauds, Statute of, § 36; [7]
Frauds, Statute of, § 59(2) •
....... - - . -
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would go to the survivor, but failure to make such determination was harmless error where the court, in a subsequent
action, correctly concluded that the widow's claim under the
agreement was barred by the statute of frauds.
[3] Id. - Jurisdiction Over Matters of Administration - Controversies With Third Persons.-The jurisdiction of superior
courts sitting in probate to administer decedents' estates
generally does not encompass power to pass upon assertions of
title to property by parties who are not in privity with the
estate but are claiming adversely to it.
[4] Id. - Jurisdiction Ovez' Matters of Administration - Controversies With Third Persons.-Exceptions to the rule that
probate courts do not have power to pass on adverse claims
by parties not in privity with the estate appear when a
controversy has been held to have a sufficient connection with
a pending probate proceeding to be properly litigated therein;
8uch connection may arise out of the relationship between the
parties, or out of the nature of the claim to the property, or
may be based upon any additional claims that a party asserting
a substantive right in a particular piece of property or in
certain assets as an heir, legatee, or devisee may assert against
those in privity with the estate in the same property.
[li] Courts-Superior Court-Jurisdiction: Decedents' EstatesJurisdiction-Superior Courts.-In the exercise of its legal and
equitable powers, a superior court sitting in probate that has
jurisdiction over one aspect of a claim to certain property ca n
determine all aspects of the claim, and a claimant is n/lt
required to sever and litigate a multi-faceted claim in separate
proceedings once all the necessary parties are before the
court. (Disapproving statements to the contrary in Sieroty v.
Silve,., 58 Ca1.2d 799 [26 Cal.Rptr. 635, 376 P.2d 563], and
Smith v. Smith~ 220 Cal.App.2d 30 [33 Cal.Rptr. 559].)

[6l Frauds, Statute of-Agreements for Leasing or Sale of Real
Property - Contracts Involved. - Agreements restricting the
right to alienate real property or to make provision for any
person by will are within the statute of frauds.
[7] Id. - Estoppel to Assert Statute - Circumstances Creating
Estoppel- Unjust Enrichment or Unconscionable Injury.There was no estoppel to assert the statute of frauds in an
action involving an alleged oral contract concerning real property, where plaintiff did not allege that she would suffer unconscionable injury, and it did not appear that others would
be unjustly enriched, if the oral contract were not enforced.
[3] See CalJur.2d, Executors and Administrators, § 22.
II c..2d-T
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APPEAL from an order and a judgment of the Superior
Court of Sacramento County. William A. White and Albert
H. Mundt, Judges. Affirmed.
Proceeding to determine heirship, and action by a widow
to impose a trust in her favor on her deceased husband's share
of certain property. Order determining heirship and judgment
of dismissal of action after demurrer was sustained witbout
leave to amend affirmed.
Frank Bottaro, DeCristoforo & DeCristoforo and Joseph
A. DeCristoforo for Plaintiff and Appellant.
.
John C. Alaimo, George DeLew and E. R. Vaughn for Defendants and Respondents, and for Interveners and Respondents.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-In these proceedings Marie Baglione,
the widow of Peter Baglione, seeks to establish her right to
succeed to certain real property in Peter's estate to the exclusion of the devisees under his will. In a proceeding to determine heirship, the superior court sitting in probate found that
the property was the community property of Marie and Peter
and should be distributed accordingly. It expressly declined to
consider Marie's claim to the entire property based on an
alleged contract that she had made with Peter on the ground
that the superior court sitting in probate had no jurisdiction
over such a claim. Marie then filed an action against the
executor of Peter's estate to enforce the alleged contract in
which Marie and Peter had agreed that the survivor would
succeed to all property acquired by the parties during the
marriage. The devisees intervened and joined in the executor's
demurrer to the complaint. After it was stipulated that the
alleged contract was oral, the court sustained the demurrer
without leave to amend and entered judgment dismissing the
action. Marie appeals from the order of the court sitting in
probate determining the interests of the parties in the estate
and from the judgment of dismissal.
Marie and Peter moved to California from Italy shortly
after their marriage in 1927. During the marriage both of
them worked. In 1944 they bought the property in question, a
tract of land near Lake Tahoe, with accumulated community
earnings and took title as joint tenants. In 1954 Marie and
Peter had domestic difficulties. Peter decided to sever the joint
tenancy and transferred his interest in the Lake Tahoe
property to one D. Benton who retransferred it to ,Peter.
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Marie learned of these transactions soon after they occurred.
In 1957 Peter filed an action for divorce alleging that the Lake
Tahoe property was community property. After discussing the
divorce with an attorney, Marie filed a cross-complaint also
alleging that the Lake Tahoe property was community
property. A reconciliation apparently followed, but on
September 19, 1957, Peter made a will, the provisions of which
were kne>wn to Marie, leaving his share of the Lake Tahoe
property to certain named relatives.
[1] Marie contends that the superior court sitting in probate erred in finding that both Peter's and her interests in the
Lake Taboo property were community property. She asserts
that when Peter severed the joint tenancy in 1954, she took a
one-half interest as her separate property but that he took his
one-half interest as community property. There is no merit
in this contention. If the deed by which Peter and Marie
took title to the land in joint tenancy reflected their true
intent, the 1954 conveyances from and to Peter severed the
.joint tenancy and thereafter the property was held by them as
·tenants in common. (Delanoy v. Delanoy, 216 Cal. 23, 26
[13 P.2d 513].) If, despite the form of the original deed,
Peter and Marie intended that the property should be
community, their intent would control (Tornaier v. Tomaier,
23 Cal.2d 754, 757 [146 P.2d 905]), and the 1954 conveyances
would have no legal effect. In either case, Peter and Marie
could agree after the 1954 conveyances to hold the property as
community property (Gudelj v. Gudelj, 41 Cal.2d 202, 212
[259 P.2d 656]), and the trial court's conclusion that they so
agreed is fully supported by their pleadings in the divorce
action in which each alleged that the property was community.
[2a] Marie contends that the superior court sitting in probate misconstrued the extent of its powers and should have
decided whether there was an agreement between her and Peter
and if so what rights were created by it. She points out that the
court's finding that the property was community property is
not inconsistent with the existence of an agreement between
the spouses to the effect that upon the death of either of them
all property accumulated during the marriage should go to the
.survivor. We have concluded that once the court sitting in
probate determined that Marie was entitled to at least her
community share of the property, it should also have aetermined any other interests she had in the same property under
the alleged contract. Since in the subsequent action, however,
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the superior court correctly concluded that Marie's contract
claim was barred by the statute of frauds, we hold that she
was not prejudiced by the court's refusal to consider that
claim in the probate proceedings.
[3] As a general rule the jurisdiction of superior couru.
sitting in probate to administer decedents' estates does no~
encompass power to pass upon assertions of title to property
by parties who are not in privity with the estate but are claiming adversely to it. (Estate of Hart, 51 Ca1.2d 819, 823 [337
P.2d 73]; Estate of Dabney, 37 Cal.2d 672, 676 [234 P.2d
962].) [4] There are, however, several well-recognized
exceptions to this rule "where a controversy has been held to
have a sufficient connection with a pending probate proceeding
to be properly litigated therein. . . . " (Oentral Bank v.
Superior Oourt, 45 Ca1.2d 10, 15 [285 P.2d 906].) The connec·
tion may arise out of the relationship between the parties.
Thus the· superior court sitting in probate can adjudicate a
claim to assets from the estate asserted by an executor or
administrator in his individual capacity (Schlyen v. Schlyen,
43 Ca1.2d 361, 372-373 [273 P.2d 897] ; Stevens v. Syperior
Oourt, 155 Cal. 148, 150-151 [99 P. 512]), and it can determine whether an assignment or other transfer of the interest
of an heir, legatee, or devisee to a third party is valid and
order distribution accordingly. (Prob. Code, §§ 1020, 1020.1;
Estate of Stanley, 34 Ca1.2d 311,318-319 [209 P.2d 941].) The
connection may also arise out of the nature of the claim to the
property. The superior court sitting in probate can determine
the claim of a surviving wife to her share of the community
property (Estate of Burdick, 112 Cal. 387. 393-396 [44 P.
734] ; Oolden v. Oostello, 50 Cal.App.2d 363, 369 [122 P.2d
959]) or adjudicate a dispute between claimants to property
"conceded . . . to be or to have been acquired . . . in the
course of probate proceedings." (0 entral Bank v. Superior
Court, supra, at p. 16; Estate of De Barry, 43 Cal.App.2d 715,
725-726 [111 P.2d 728J.) In Woods v. Security-First Nat.
Bank, 46 Ca1.2d 697 [299 P.2d 657], we recognized a third
type of exception based on the nature of the claim. and the
claimant's relationship to the estate. When a party invokes
the jurisdiction of a court sitting in probate by asserting a
substantive right in a particular piece of property or in
certain assets as an heir, legatee, or devisee, he may also obtain
a judgment in that court determining any additional claims
that he asserts against those in privity with the estate in the
same property. (Id. at p. 704; see Estate of Stone, 170 Cal.
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App.2d 533, 537-539 [339 P.2d 220].) The rationale for this
exception is the conservation of time, energy, and money of all
concerned. To deny a superior court sitting in probate the
power to determine the whole controversy between the parties
before it is pointless. [5] In the exercise of its legal and
equitable powers (see Schlyen v. Schlyen, supra, at p. 371;
Estate of Cover, 188 Cal. 133, 139 [204 P. 583]), a superior
court sitting in probate that has jurisdiction over one aspect
of a claim to certain property can determine all aspects of the
claim. A claimant is not required to sever and litigate a multifaceted claim in separate proceedings once all the necessary
parties are before the court. Thus in the instant case, once the
court determined that Marie had a community interest in the
Lake Tahoe property subject to probate, it should have
resolved the entire controversy and determined her rights to
that property under the alleged oral agreement with the
deceased. Any statements in Sieroty v. Silver, 58 Ca1.2d 799
[26 Cal. Rptr. 635, 376 P.2d 563], and Smith v. Smith, 220'
Ca1.App.2d 30 [33 Ca1.Rptr. 559], to the contrary are disapproved.
[2b] The court's error in refusing to entertain Marie's
contract claim in the probate proceedings was made harmless,
however, once the superior court, in the exercise of its general
equity powers, took jurisdiction over and passed on the claim
in a separate action. In that action Marie alleged in substance
that she and Peter orally agreed throughout their marriage
that all property acquired by them would be held in such a
manner that on the death of one the survivor would succeed to
it and that Peter breached this agreement by severing the joint
tenancy and executing a will naming his relatives as devisees.
[6] Agreements restricting the right to alienate real
property or to make provision for any person by will are
within the statute of frauds. (See Civ. Code, §§ 1091, 1624,
subds. 4, 6; Code Civ. Proc., § 1971; Cottom v. Bennett, 214
Cal.App.2d 709, 717 [29 Cal.Rptr. 715] ; Pellerito v. Dragna,
41 Cal.App.2d 85, 89 [105 P.2d 1011].) [7] Marie contends, however, that she has alleged sufficient facts to estop
the executor and devisees from relying on the statute of_
frauds. There is no estoppel unless :6farie would suffer unconscionable injury or the devisees would be unjustly enriched if
the oral contract were not enforced. (Ruinello v. Murray, 36
Cal.2d 687, 689 [227 P.2d 251]; Monarco v. Lo Greco, 35
Ca1.2d 621, 623-624 [220 P.2d 737], and cases cited.) "The
doctrine of estoppel has been applied where an unconscionable
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injury would result from denying enforcement after one party
has been induced to make a serious change of position in reliance on the contract or where unjust enrichment would result
if a party who has received the benefits of the other's
performallce were allowed to invoke the statute." (Day v.
Greene, 59 CaL2d 404, 410 [29 Cal.Rptr. 785, 380 P.2d 385, 94
A.L.R.2d 802].) Marie has not alleged any serious change of
position in reliance on the contract or that her contributions to
the community earnings were different from those that she
would have made in any event as Peter's wife. (Cf., Monarco
v. Lo Greco, 35 Ca1.2d 621, 624 [220 P.2d 737].) Her injury is
merely the loss of the benefit of a bargain within the statute.
Nor will the devisees be unjustly enriched if the contract is
not enforced. They take through Peter, and since he died first,
he received no benefits under the contract. (Cf. Day v. Greene,
59 Ca1.2d 404, 410-411 [29 Cal.Rptr. 785, 380 P.2d 385, 94
A.L.R.2d 802] ; Notten v. Mensing, 3 Ca1.2d 469, 474 [45 P.2d
198].) Equity" will not enforce an oral agreement within the
statute of frauds solely because not to do so would permit a
defendant to assert the statute and thus avoid the parol obligation." (Beazell v. Schrader, 59 Ca1.2d 577, 582 [30 Cal..
Rptr. 534, 381 P.2d 390] ; Zellner v. Wassman, 184 Cal. 80, 85
[193 P. 84J.) Since at no time during these proceedings has
Marie indicated any basiR on which an estoppel to assert the
statute of frauds could be predicated, the trial court did not
err in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend.
The judgment of dismissal and the order determining heirship are affirmed.
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobril1er, J., Peek, J., Mosk, J., and
Burke, J., concurred.
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